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Abstract 
7KLVFRQWULEXWLRQDQDO\VHVWKHSRWHQWLDOOHJDORXWFRPHVWRPHHWLQJWKH8.·Vdemands in advance of the 
referendum and what they might mean for EU integration should the UK vote to remain in the Union. 
,WDUJXHV WKDW WKHUH LVXQOLNHO\ WREHD ¶TXLFN IL[· WRPHHW WKHGHPDQGVVLQFH WKHUH LVQRREYLRXV OHJDO
mechanism which can satisfy the demands in either substance or the proposed time-frame, as supported 
earlier in the debate. 
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1. Introduction 
7KH TXHVWLRQ WR EH SXW WR WKH 8. HOHFWRUDWH ¶'R \RX ZLVK IRU WKH 8. WR Uemain a member of the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ"·(XURSHDQ8QLRQ5HIHUHQGXPAct 2015) on 23 June 2016 leaves open the additional 
TXHVWLRQRIZKDW IRUPD UHODWLRQVKLSZRXOG WDNH LQ WKHHYHQWRID ¶UHPDLQ·YRWH7KH UHIHUHQGXP has 
been premised on the renegotiation of the relationship between the UK and the EU, as was the stated 
objective of Prime Minister David Cameron in his Bloomberg speech in 2013, which launched the 
referendum process. The manifesto commitment of the Conservative Party before the May 2015 general 
election was to bring forward renegotiation proposals as soon as possible, though these were only finally 
revealed in a letter to Council President Donald Tusk on 10 November 2015 (Cameron 2015a) and a 
speech at Chatham House on the same day (Cameron 2015b). The agreement reached by the European 
Council on 19 February 2016 on a new settlement for the UK in the EU set the wheels in motion for a 
June referendum. However, translating this agreement into the legal order of the Union is far from 
settled. 
The negotiating situation the UK and the EU have found themselves in is unprecedented. A large-scale 
revision of the Treaties in the past has been conducted through the convening of an Intergovernmental 
Conference. Minor treaties which introduce changes (such as the accession of a new Member State) have 
been the result of agreement amongst the Member States, though not always without controversy at the 
domestic ratification stage. The UK already enjoys a more differentiated relationship with the EU than 
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all other Member States; including a permanent opt out from the euro, the Schengen area, aspects of 
Justice and Home Affairs, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of course, the budget rebate agreed in 
the 1980s. Any further changes, as well as opening the opportunity for other states to join with their 
demands for exceptional treatment, suggest that the single, unitary legal order of the EU is severely 
under pressure. In short, even with an agreement on a new settlement for the UK in the EU, we are still 
largely in the dark about what the consequences will be for the relationship between the UK and the EU 
and for WKH(8·VRZQOHJDORUGHU if the UK decides to remain a Member State. 
This contribution analyses the legal outcomes in meetiQJ WKH 8.·V GHPDQGV LQ DGYDQFH RI WKH
referendum and what they might mean for EU integration should the UK vote to remain in the Union 
(Butler et. al 2016). 7KLVDUWLFOHDUJXHVWKDWWKHUHLVXQOLNHO\WREHD¶TXLFNIL[·WRPHHWWKHGHPDQGVVLQFH
there is no obvious legal mechanism which can satisfy the demands in either substance or the proposed 
time-frame, as supported earlier in the debate (Lazowski 2016). If the UK votes to remain a Member 
State, then the practice of differentiated integration in the EU is likely to be (further) constitutionalized.  
2. The UK demands DQGWKH¶QHZVHWWOHPHQW· 
&DPHURQ·VOHWWHUVWDWHVWKDWWKHFRQFHUQVRIWKH%ULWLVKSHRSOH¶UHDOO\ERLOGRZQWRRQHZRUGIOH[LELOLW\·
(Cameron 2015a). By this, it seems that he means the EU should be able to accommodate flexibility in 
the process of integration and ability to operate with the ¶VSHHG DQG IOH[LELOLW\ RI D QHWZRUN QRW
FXPEHUVRPH ULJLGLW\RI DEORF· &DPHURQ Does he also mean flexibility in terms of how these 
should be accommodated? This does not appear to be the case: the letter of demands makes repeated 
refereQFHV WR ¶IRUPDO· DQG ¶OHJDOO\ ELQGLQJ SULQFLSOHV· DV D PHDQV RI HQVXULQJ WKDW WKH GHPDQGV IRU D
reformed relationship are met, rather than by informal, political agreement(s) (Cameron 2015a), 
potentially seen by other EU Member States (Oliver 2016). He has since underlined the nature of the 
GHFLVLRQWDNHE\WKH(XURSHDQ&RXQFLODV¶OHJDOO\ELQGLQJ·WKRXJKZKDWWKLVSUHFLVHO\KDVEHHQGLVSXWHG
by some of his own Ministers. This lack of flexibility is likely to have important implications for both 
finding an DSSURSULDWH PHDQV WR GR VR ZLWKLQ WKH (8·V OHJDO RUGHU DQG KLV DELOLW\ WR JDLQ DJUHHPHQW
DPRQJVWWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV%XWVXPPDUL]LQJWKHGHPDQGVDVRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH(8DVD¶EORF·VSHDNVWR
a tension over some of the ways in which the EU has developed as an integration process, including the 
enforcement of EU law in the Member States. For this reason, the demands cannot merely be seen as 
WHFKQLFDOPHDQVRI VHFXULQJ ¶RSWRXWV· IURPSDUWLFXODUSROLFLHV, but must be seen in the much bigger, 
constitutional picture. 
The renegotiation strategy adopted by the UK government relied on four main demands (Jensen and 
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Snaith 2016). )LUVWWKH¶LQWHJULW\RIWKH6LQJOH0DUNHW·QHHGVSURWHFWLQJWRHQVXUHWKHULJKWVRIQRQ-euro 
Member States in law and policy-making. Second, emphasis should be placed on cutting red-tape and the 
¶EXUGHQ· RQ EXVLQHVV DQG ZRUN WRZDUGV WKH (8·V FRPPLWPHQW WR ¶IUHH IORZ RI FDSLWDO JRRGV DQG
VHUYLFHV· DV DPHDQVRIERRVWLQJ FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV7KLUG WKH8.·V VRYHUHLJQW\QHHGV WREHSURWHFWHG
LQFOXGLQJE\HQGLQJ WKHREOLJDWLRQ WR WKH ¶HYHUFORVHUXQLRQ· DQGJUHDWHUFRPPLWPHQWV WR VXEVLGLDULW\
Fourth, EU migratLRQWRWKH8.QHHGVWREHUHGXFHGE\FUDFNLQJGRZQRQ¶DEXVH·DQGWKHHQWLWOHPHQW
to benefits and social welfare by imposing greater waiting periods for EU citizens (Cameron 2015a). 
The demands are diverse and cut across different areas of EU activity. As such, the legal responses are 
unlikely to be easily captured in one instrument or mechanism. The diversity is evident in the language 
XVHGDVSDUWRIWKHGHPDQGVZKLFKDUHQRWFU\VWDOOL]HGDURXQGRQHW\SHRIPHFKDQLVPVXFKDVDQ¶RSW
RXW·,QGHHGRQHRIthe demands ² on competitiveness ² actually calls for more integration around three 
of the four freedoms (capital, goods and services) whilst scaling back on the free movement of workers. 
Rather, they might conceivably be achieved in the following ways: a change to existing Treaty provisions 
by adding or altering provisions which do or do not specifically refer to the UK; an agreement which 
does not amend the Treaty at present but which would be incorporated into future Treaty revisions; the 
adoptions of a legislative programme (based on, but separate to the Treaty arrangements); or changes to 
current EU legislation adopted pursuant to existing Treaty articles. This diversity has a strong impact on 
the type of legal mechanisms able to satisfy them. It should also be borne in mind that some of the 
demands relate to the direction the EU should take in the future, and therefore cannot be satisfied by 
any single agreement or disposition. 
3. 7KH¶HYHUFORVHUXQLRQ· 
The clearest demand for a particular Treaty provision to not DSSO\WRWKH8.LVWKDWRIWKH¶HYHUFORVHU
8QLRQ·7KHVHZRUGVDSSHDUWZLFHLQWKHTEU, in the preamble and Article 1 TEU, the relevant part of 
ZKLFKUHDGV¶7KLV7UHDW\PDUNVDQHZVWDJHLQWKHSURFHVVRIFUHDWLQJDQHYHUFORVHUXQLRQDPRQJWKH
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the 
FLWL]HQ·*LYHQWKDWWKLVLVDIXQGDPHQWDOSDUWRIWKH(8·V UDLVRQG·rWUH LWLVGLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZDQ¶HYHU
FORVHU8QLRQIRUDOOEXWRQHRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV·LVLQDQ\ZD\SUDFWLFDOXQOHVVWKLVJRDOLVUHPRYHG
from the Treaty entirely, which is highly unlikely. The provision encapsulates the spirit and purpose of 
the Treaty (which was, of course, signed and ratified by all Member States) as an integration process. But 
the principle has also provided the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with a means to 
resolve disputes before it when faced with a binary choice between a more and a less integrationist 
position. It is no doubt this aspect which has caused some consternation in the same way that the CJEU 
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LVDFFXVHGRI¶ZLGHQLQJWKHVFRSH· of EU law in the immigration part of the demands. This demand is 
difficult to reconcile with the recent dicta of the CJEU in its Opinion 2/13 on the  
structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU 
and LWV0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGLWV0HPEHU6WDWHVZLWKHDFKRWKHUZKLFKDUHQRZHQJDJHG«LQD
¶SURFHVVRIFUHDWLQJDQHYHUFORVHUXQLRQDPRQJ WKHSHRSOHVRI(XURSH· Opinion 2/13 of the 
CJEU, 18 December 2014, para 167) 
7KDWVDLG WKH ¶HYHUFORVHUXQLRQ·KDVQRWJHQHUDOO\EHHQ LQWHUSUHWHGDVPHDQLQJ WKDW WKH(8KDV ² or 
should have ² unlimited competence to harmonize, since this is evident from the text of the rest of the 
Treaty. There are many areas of activity where harmonization has not fully progressed, as Cameron 
implies in his call for further integration of the single market and some areas where there is little or no 
integration. However, key to the success of integration so far has been the development of legal 
SULQFLSOHVDURXQGWKH ¶QHZ OHJDORUGHU· of the EU and the concept of this legal order being essentially 
singular, enabling coherence to flow from the CJEU to the national courts in the interpretation and 
effective enforcement of EU law (Cardwell and Hervey 2015). The single legal order may be at risk if 
such a general principle of EU law does not apply to the UK. Would it mean thus that in CJEU cases 
involving the UK, an argument could be raised that the purpose of a certain measure cannot be seen in 
the light of the purpose of the Treaty and should therefore not apply? This would mean potentially 
different responses to cases involving another Member State. The answer to this question is unclear but 
the CJEU would no doubt look to other instances within the Treaty which reflect its nature as creating 
and furthering an integration process. Just as Cameron calls for competitiveness to be wired ¶LQWR WKH
DN$RIWKHZKROH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·LWLVFRQWHQGHGKHUHWKDWWKH¶HYHUFORVHUXQLRQ·LVWKHLQVSLUDWLRQ
behind the whole integration process, whether or not those words actually appear in the Treaty or not 
(as is the case for direct effect, for example). 
How could this issue be resolved? It seems that either a change to the Treaty by removing Article 1 TEU 
DQG WKH PHQWLRQ RI WKH ¶HYHU FORVHU XQLRQ· IURP WKH SUHDPEOH LV XQOLNHO\ in the short-term. The 
agreement adopted at the European Council recognises that thH 8. ¶LV QRW FRPPLWWHG WR IXUWKHU
SROLWLFDO LQWHJUDWLRQLQWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·DQGWKDWWKH¶VXEVWDQFHRIWKLVZLOOEHLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWR
WKH7UHDWLHVDWWKHWLPHRIWKHLUQH[WUHYLVLRQ·(XURSHDQ&RXQFLO Altering the wording, such as to 
DQ¶HYHr closer union LQWKHILHOGVZKLFKWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVKDYHDJUHHG·might be possible, though it 
already appears to be substantively covered by the competence provisions which follow shortly after 
(Article 5 TEU). Alternatively, a protocol could be added to WKH7UHDW\ZKLFKUHDIILUPV WKDW WKH ¶HYHU
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FORVHUXQLRQ·GRHVQRWDSSO\LQDOOFRQWH[WV7KLVFRXOGEHHLWKHUVSHFLILFWRWKH8.MRLQHGE\DQ\RWKHU
like-minded Member States) or a more general formulation. Or perhaps it could be defined more 
negatively, sXFKDV ¶1RWKLQJ LQ WKH7UHDWLHV VKDOO FRPPLW WKH8. WR«·7KLV ODWWHU H[DPSOHPLJKWEH
VLPLODU WR 3URWRFRO 1R  DQQH[HG WR WKH 7UHDWLHV ¶QRWKLQJ LQ WKH 7UHDWLHV« VKDOO DIIHFW WKH
DSSOLFDWLRQLQ,UHODQGRI$UWLFOHRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRI,UHODQG· which concerns abortion) though 
in a much less specific way. AFFRUGLQJWR$UWLFOH7(8¶7KH3URWRFROVDQG$QQH[HVWRWKH7UHDWLHV
VKDOO IRUP DQ LQWHJUDO SDUW WKHUHRI· )XUWKHUPRUH WKH DGGLWLRQ RU DPHQGPHQWV RI SURWRFROV ZRXOG
UHTXLUH¶WKHIXOO7UHDW\DPHQGPHQWSURFHVV·3HHUV'HFODUDWLRQVRIZKLFKWKHUHDUHDQQH[HGWR
the Treaties post-/LVERQ áD]RZVNL 2016) (with 5 by the UK acting alone or with another Member 
States) could be used with the same wording and would not require the Treaty amendment process, 
ZKLOVW ¶IRUPDO·ZRXOG IDOO VKRUWRI D UHTXLUHPHQW WREH OHJDOO\ELQGLQJ Any kind of Treaty change or 
DGGLWLRQ3URWRFROZRXOGVHHPWRPHHW&DPHURQ·VGHPDQGIRUDFKDQJHLQ¶IRUPDO OHJDOO\-binding and 
LUUHYHUVLEOHZD\·EXWZLOOEHVXEMHFWWR a Treaty-revision procedure at some point in the future. This in 
itself is likely to be highly contentious. 
4. Subsidiarity 
Subsidiarity is found in the Treaty in Article 5(3) TEU: 
the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Union level.  
&DPHURQ·VOHWWHUFDOOVIRUWKH (8·VFRPPLWPHQWVWRVXEVLGLDULW\WREH¶IXOO\LPSOHPHQWHG·%XWZKDWGRHV
this mean? The principle ² introduced explicitly by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 ² is a notoriously 
slippery concept to define in the absence of a fully-fledged constitution for the EU (Davies 2006). What 
LVPHDQWE\LWV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ·LVHYHQWULFNLHUZLWKWKHSRWHQWLDOH[FHSWLRQRIWKHJUHDWHUUROHSURSRVHG
for national parliaments. Protocol no. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, annexed to the Treaties, is to be read in conjunction with Art 5(3) for draft legislative 
acts and concerns the processes the Commission must go through to ensure compliance with 
subsidiarity. It essentially rests on an evaluation of whether the EU should or should not act in any given 
DUHDRIVKDUHGFRPSHWHQFHYLDD¶FRPSDUDWLYHHIILFLHQF\·WHVW6FKW]H6XEVLGLDULW\LVODUJHO\D
subjective and vaguely defined principle. Although it has generated much academic commentary since 
Maastricht, clarity provided by the judiciary is not forthcoming since there have been relatively few 
British Exit from the EU: Legal and Political Implications 
Edited by Graham Butler, Mads Dagnis Jensen, and Holly Snaith 
Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 23, Debate Section 
 
 
 
6 
RSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUWKH&-(8WRFRQVLGHUVXEVLGLDULW\ LQGHWDLO7KH&RXUW·VVXEVLGLDULW\UHYLHZKDVEHHQ
FKDUDFWHUL]HGDV¶OLJKW·&UDLJDQG'H%~UFDDQG¶UDWKHUXQGHUZKHOPLQJ·+RUVOH\
The UK attempted, under the previous majority Conservative government, to challenge the Working 
Time directive on the grounds of subsidiarity ² a judgment which the UK lost but of which the text has 
had a structuring effect on the judicial vision of subsidiarity ever since  (Schütze 2012: 182). It is no 
coincidence that this particular directive ² often cited by opponents of EU membership as an example 
of the institutions overstepping the mark, has provided the impetus for tKH GHPDQG WR ¶LPSOHPHQW·
subsidiarity more fully, despite it not being a familiar concept in the UK legal system.  
It is difficult to imagine how the Treaties provision or the existing Protocol could be revised to 
accommodate this particular UK demand. Given that the demand emphasizes implementation, it may 
not be the wording itself but rather an elaboration of the understanding of what should be done at EU 
level and what should not. This might be on a policy-by-policy basis or by an even more elaborate 
process-based policy than is provided by the current Protocol no. 2. At the same time, it is inconceivable 
that the UK would be arguing for the Court of Justice to have greater responsibility for implementing 
and defining the parameters of subsidiarity-based review.  
The most obvious institutional means to secure greater subsidiarity in practice is via the role of national 
pDUOLDPHQWV7KLV LVFXULRXVO\ OLVWHGVHSDUDWHO\ZLWKLQWKHGHPDQGVRQVRYHUHLJQW\ LQ&DPHURQ·V OHWWHU
even though the main institutional innovation relating to subsidiarity within the Treaty of Lisbon was the 
FUHDWLRQRIWKH¶\HOORZ·DQG¶RUDQJH·FDUGSURFHGXUHVIRUQDWLRQDOSDUOLDPHQWV0HPEHU6WDWHV·QDWLRQDO
SDUOLDPHQWV· having a greater role is GLIILFXOW WR DUJXH DJDLQVW ¶ORVHUV RI LQWHJUDWLRQ· VHH IRU H[DPSOH
Auel and Höing 2014). It is too early to tell whether these procedures are effective or not, since the 
yellow card has only been used twice and the orange card not at all (European Commission 2015; 
Fabbrini and Granat 2013). As noted in analysis of the Treaty of Lisbon (Craig 2010: 186), the question 
of whether national parliaments could use this principle by successfully bringing Article 263 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) actions (judicial review) or submitting 
reasoned opinions to the Commission as to why subsidiarity was infringed is an interesting possibility. 
With this in mind, it is still too early to conclude whether these important innovations at Lisbon have 
proved worthwhilH RU QRW ,W LV QRW FOHDU PRUHRYHU ZKHWKHU WKH ¶FOHDU SURSRVDOV· FDOOHG IRU RQ WKH
implementation of subsidiarity principles concern more than national parliaments but other actors too, 
VXFKDVFLWL]HQVRUZKHWKHUWKLVLVDQDWWHPSWWRFOHDUXSWKH¶FRQFHSWXDOFRQWRXUV·6FKW]H
of the principle. The European Council agreement places the emphasis on national parliaments to issue 
reasoned opinions on legislative drafts, which (if they account for more than 55% of the votes allocated 
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to national Parliaments) will trigger a discussion in the Council. It will then be for the Council to decide 
whether to discontinue the measure (European Council 2016). No amendment to the Treaty on this 
point is therefore suggested or included in the European Council agreement. 
5. &RQFOXVLRQGLIIHUHQWLDWHGLQWHJUDWLRQDQGWKH¶XQLW\·RIWKHOHJDORUGHU 
If the above demands are eventually woven into the Treaty arrangements in some way, in the result of a 
vote for remaining in the EU, then there is potentially a fundamental shift in both UK-EU relations and 
even in the legal order of the EU itself. Whether or not any changes apply to all Member States or the 
UK alone, it would be very difficult to argue against the position that the EU is increasingly a 
¶PXOWLVSHHG· projeFWRUD(XURSHRI¶YDULDEOHJHRPHWU\·,WZRXOGVHHPOLNHO\WKDWRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV
even those who have not in the past sought exceptional treatment, would be likely to do so on the basis 
of national preoccupations. This has strong implications for our understanding of the legal order of the 
EU which is based around the single legal order. Legal analysis based on the idea of the EU as a single 
OHJDOV\VWHPFDQQRWH[SODLQLQWHJUDWLRQSURFHVVHVZLWKYDULDEOHLQWHJUDWLRQWKRXJKQHLWKHUFDQWKH(8·V
variable OHJDO RUGHU EH WUHDWHG RQ DQ HQWLUHO\ ¶LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO· EDVLV DQG KHQFH FORVHU WR ¶FODVVLF·
international law). The role of both the CJEU and national courts in enforcing EU law and hence 
ensuring the effectiveness of the legal system would face great challenges in a legal system which would 
essentially be decentralized or pluralistic (De Búrca and Weiler 2011; Shaw et al. 2011). Whilst it might 
EHDUJXHG WKDW WKLV LVDOUHDG\ WKHFDVHZH ILQG LQ WKH8.·VGHPDQGVH[FHSWLRQV WRVRPHRI WKHEDVLV
constitutional provisions of EU law which is highly suggestive of a significant shift. 
 
In the event of a remain vote, the appetite for enacting major changes to the Treaty amongst the 
Member States seems less and less likely. More pressing problems facing the EU (such as the refugee 
DQGHXUR¶FULVHV·FRQWULEXWHWRWKHfear amongst most other Member States and the EU institutions to 
embark up full-scale treaty negotiation. It is also highly likely that many Member States ² especially those 
ZLWK JRYHUQPHQW·V IDFLQJ HOHFWRUDO SUHVVXUH IURP WKH H[WUHPHV RI WKH SROLWLFDO VSHFWUXP ² will be 
tempted to bargain for special treatment too. However, that is not to say that the process of attempting 
to unpick key constitutional aspects of the Treaty will not be attempted in the future, either by the UK 
or others, thus inevitably resulting in that the legal system of the EU being faced with the need to 
consistently adapt to change.  
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